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Abstract 
This draft of our contribution to “The politics and economics of change in European social 
models” book project, is focused on the relation between macroeconomic policies and social 
models in the EU 15 during the last two decades. It first describes the shift towards the 
Maastricht “culture of discipline”, i.e. the effect of the implementation of rules governing 
macroeconomic policies management for euro area countries, assesses its consequence in 
terms of economic performance and evaluates how those rules are playing out so far in the 
current crisis. We then attempt at detailing the second shift towards “structural reforms” of 
social models to show how it has resulted in a weakening of “automatic stabilizers” that, 
therefore, can’t fully play their role in the current crisis. Finally, we offer some analytical 
insights to make sense of those two shifts. 
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Introduction: “American crisis”, European predicament 
 
Since the start of the turmoil on global financial markets in the Spring of 2007 and its brutal 
acceleration in the Fall of 20081, EU officials have been keen on viewing the continuing 
degradation of the financial, economic and social context as a consequence of an “American 
financial crisis”. As late as December 2008, their claim was that, since European banks and 
consumers stayed clear of excessive risk-taking, over-consumption and unsustainable 
indebtedness, the EU economy, and the euro area in particular, would be less affected by 
economic stagnation and its painful social consequence. 
 
It has become extremely hard to maintain this view in the face of declining growth and 
massive layoffs in continental Europe. Actually, figures for 2008 are contrasting the European 
view: according to Eurostat, the OECD and the IMF, growth in the EU and the euro area was 
lower than in the US, in a range of 19% to 37%.  
 
GDP growth for 2008, in % 
 
 Eurostat IMF OECD
 
Euro area  0.8  0.9 
 
0.7 
EU 27  0.9 –– –– 
US 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Total OECD –– –– 0.9 
Emerging and developing countries –– 6.1 –– 
World  –– 3.2 –– 
Data source: IMF, Eurostat, OECD. 
 
The detail per quarter of the dynamic of entry into recession of the US and the EU helps 
understand why the respective situation of two regions has reversed in the course of 2008: 
Europe was growing more than the US in the beginning of the year, but something happened 
that turned this situation upside down, so that the US, which grew faster in Q2, Q3 and as fast 
in Q4, eventually displayed higher growth for the whole year. 
 
 
Whatever the interpretation of economic events, the social consequence of the European 
recession is clear: unemployment is, again, rising at a fast pace in Europe to reach almost 
already its level of the year 2000 in the euro area. 
 
The business cycle dating in the euro area and US, respectively established by the NBER and 
CEPR, confirm that, once again contrary to the European view held for most of 2008, both 
regions entered into recession almost simultaneously. With regards to the US, the NBER 
notes: “The committee determined that a peak in economic activity occurred in the U.S. 
economy in December 2007. The peak marks the end of the expansion that began in 
November 2001 and the beginning of a recession. The expansion lasted 73 months; the 
previous expansion of the 1990s lasted 120 months2”. Regarding the euro area, the CEPR 
released the following assessment3: “Our best judgment specifying the month of the peak is 
                                                 
1 Two possible turning points being April 2nd 2007 (bankruptcy of News Century Financial) and 
September 14th 2008 (collapse without subsequent governmental bail-out of Lehman Brothers).  
2 NBER, December 2008, http://www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.html  
3 CPER, March 2009, http://www.cepr.org/press/Dating-Committee-Findings-31-March-2009.pdf  
January 2008. The peak marks the end of the expansion that began in the third quarter of 1993 
and the beginning of a recession. The expansion lasted 57 quarters or more than 14 years.”4  
 
What emerges is thus the following picture: contrary to the European perception and official 
public claim, the EU and the euro area have been hit almost simultaneously with the US by a 
brutal economic deceleration turning to recession from the beginning of 2008; the EU has 
since suffered more than the US from this recession in terms of loss of output.  
 
This brings about a natural question at the center of this chapter: what about the European 
macroeconomic response to the crisis? The European position, stated forcefully at the G20 
summit in London in early April and through numerous interventions by the ECB, the 
Eurogroup and national governments is twofold: the economic shock is not as severe in 
Europe as it is in the US so that the overall European fiscal and monetary response need not to 
be as massive as the American one; the EU can rely on its “automatic stabilizers” to buffer the 
recession anyhow, so that, within the overall European response, discretionary 
macroeconomic policy need not be as strong as in the US. 
 
The first part of this claim seems not only weak but simply false according to the available 
evidence: the shock has stronger consequence in the EU and the euro area than in the US. 
Hence a consistency problem with the second part of the argument: since the discretionary 
response was weaker in 2008 in the EU than it was in the US, something did not quite work as 
expected with European automatic stabilizers that could actually not prevent a severe output 
contraction, so that in the future, with the crisis lasting, we can expect that they will not work 
well enough. The EU and the euro area should thus more actively stimulate their economies if 
they want to avoid a further decline in their GDP, yet, for now, a majority of member states is 
opposed to it. Overall, the European position, with all its dimensions taken into account, 
seems quite hard to understand on the ground of economic logic.  
 
More importantly, and this is what we intend to demonstrate in this chapter, it is rooted in two 
crucial shifts that occurred during the last two decades: the emergence of the Maastricht 
“culture of discipline” in macroeconomic management, that led to the implementation of 
restrictive rules on monetary and fiscal policy; the contemporary European “commitment to 
structural reforms” of social models, that promoted the rolling back of social protection 
programs and labour market flexibility. Those two fundamental shifts are interlinked but not 
in an efficient way: macroeconomic policies can indeed be relatively passive if social 
protection systems take care of the unemployed, but the resulting soft growth path will 
gradually put the social protection system and public finance under growing pressure in times 
of downturn, as fiscal and social receipts will slowdown at the very moment where social 
expenditures are increasing ; on the other hand, under a soft growth regime and absent 
reactive macroeconomic policies to counter economic contractions, “structural reforms” of 
social models may seem to be the natural economic policy but their effectiveness are largely 
doubtful on both theoretical and empirical grounds.  
  
This first draft of our contribution to “The politics and economics of change in European 
social models” book project, focused on the relation between macroeconomic policies and 
social models in the EU 15 during the last two decades, first describes the shift towards the 
Maastricht “culture of discipline”, i.e. the effect of the implementation of rules governing 
macroeconomic policies management for euro area countries, assesses its consequence in 
                                                 
4 On the nature of this impressively long “expansion”, see infra. 
terms of economic performance and evaluates how those rules are playing out so far in the 
current crisis. Our focus is naturally on the 10 countries covered by case studies chapters, all 
of them except Norway in the EU 15 and 7 in the euro area, and our time frame is more or 
less the last two decades. Since we believe that the most important macroeconomic event in 
the last two decades in the EU 15 was EMU, we attempt to compare countries inside and 
outside monetary union on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the euro area and the only 
comparable economic region, the US, in terms of macroeconomic performance and policies. 
We then attempt at detailing the second shift towards “structural reforms” of social models to 
show how it has resulted in a weakening of “automatic stabilizers” that, therefore, can’t fully 
play their role in the current crisis.  
 
Finally, we try to make sense of those two shifts by developing two analytical arguments. 
First, as insufficient cooperation between European states is obvious in the current crisis, it 
has to be put in perspective. Non-cooperative policies have actually rationally developed in 
the euro area with, in their background, the economic consequence of country size. The 
second set of analytical arguments we make relies on “public social customs” and norms: 
social customs between European states play a role in constraining inefficient outcomes; the 
course of European macroeconomic policies in the last two decades can also be seen as a way 
to force “structural reforms” in member states so as to achieve a new inequality norm.  
 
 
The Maastricht “culture of discipline”: the game of the rule 
 
The opposition between the EU and the US in terms of macroeconomic activism seems as 
clear-cut as it is logic: economic policies have to be active only where the social protection 
system is insufficient to maintain consumption levels of the less wealthy (the US) and passive 
where the system is thought to be generous (the EU). The US don’t have (and maybe don’t 
want) a developed welfare state, hence they must rely on monetary and fiscal reactive policies 
whenever they face a downturn, because if they don’t, the social cost of economic crisis 
becomes politically unbearable. The EU countries on the contrary, albeit with important 
variations, do have generous welfare states so that they don’t need to be as active in terms of 
macroeconomic policies: they can rely, in time of economic downturn, on built-in 
mechanisms that form an “encapsulated fiscal policy”, able to mechanically smooth economic 
contractions. At the heart of this apparent logic lies an important contradiction: massive 
unemployment can develop in the EU to excessive levels because it does not automatically 
provoke a major crisis of under-consumption.  
 
What is an undeniable strength of the European model, the size of its welfare state, may 
indeed become a weakness as it can be used as a pretext not to follow an appropriate 
macroeconomic policy reaction to the rise of unemployment. Our general view is that 
Europeans, obsessed with the nominal convergence and stability at the core of Maastricht 
“culture of discipline”, did not act enough to fight unemployment in the early 1990s and 
foster economic growth as they embarked on a decade of painful artificial convergence 
concluded by the successful launching of the euro and a subsequent decade of non-
cooperative policies, concluded by the current crisis.  
 
Indeed, starting in the late 1980s, macroeconomic policy became uni-dimensional in Europe, 
only seeking to meet a single objective: price stability. But, even if macroeconomic policies 
could no longer be mobilized to promote employment, the social cost of unemployment was 
largely masked by the importance of social protection. The abnormally high level of interest 
rates to which this macroeconomic orientation lead in the early 1990s has worsened the 
recession while weakening recovery at the same time. Later on, expansionary shocks, where 
they appeared (late 1990s, early 2000s), have been softened to prevent the emergence of 
inflationary surges. Trends towards employment imbalance could therefore only increase, 
with phases of expansion never being sufficient to wipe out the employment consequences of 
previous recessions. But this tendency was able to make itself evident without provoking a 
major social and political crisis because the public sector acted as a kind of shock-absorber: it 
has carried most of the burden of adjustment and was consequently in structural deficit. Yet 
this deficit should not be interpreted as a sign of fiscal discretionary policy: it was hardly used 
to stimulate the economy when it needed the most, in the early 1990s and 2000s. 
 
First, we try to evaluate and compare the macroeconomic performance of euro area countries, 
the three big countries within the euro area (that make up for two-thirds of euro area GDP), 
the three EU 15 countries outside the euro area and the US. 
 
The nominal performance of euro area countries and of the three big countries within it is 
impressive: inflation has been divided by four since the early 1980s and stabilized at a low 
level while in the US inflation has been only halved and remained higher in the 2000s. Yet, 
the inflation performance of countries outside the euro area is even better than those in the 
euro area.  
 
 
 
Consumer Price Index,  
annual growth in % 
    
 Average Average Average 
 1979-1991 1992-1998 1999-2007
    
Three big euro area 6,34 2,65 1,75 
Euro area 8,09 3,06 2,06 
EU non-euro 7,32 2,34 1,58 
US 5,88 2,60 2,71 
Data source: OECD. 
 
 
 
This inflation performance of euro area countries is even more impressive when one adds unit 
labour cost: both have been lowered and stabilized and, from this point of view, monetary 
union has been a success, although, as stated supra, countries outside the euro area display 
even better achievement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prices and costs lowering and stabilization  in the euro area 
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Data source: OECD. 
 
 
 
But the euro area stands out when unit labour costs are considered: they have been reduced 
significantly more in the last decade than in non-euro area EU 15 countries and in the US. The 
euro area, it seems, has pushed further than these other countries the logic of nominal 
stability.  
 
 
 
 Unit labour cost, annual growth in %
    
 Average Average Average 
 1979-1991 1992-1998 1999-2007 
    
Three big euro area 5,95 1,55 1,33 
Euro area 5,90 1,83 1,59 
EU non-euro 7,60 1,86 2,48 
US 4,76 1,91 2,29 
Data source: OECD. 
 
 
But this “culture of discipline” does not pay off as far as real economic performance are 
concerned. While real GDP growth was higher or comparable in euro area countries in the 
1980s, it was much lower in the phase of monetary convergence (1992-1998) and still lower 
in the 2000s, lower than the US and lower than the EU non-euro countries. Monetary union 
does not seem to be a success in terms of economic growth. This evolution is confirmed with 
regards to GDP per capita dynamic. The difference here is the evolution of the US population 
that lowers GDP per capita growth in the US, especially in the 1990s and the 2000s. But the 
gap between the three big countries in the euro area, the euro area and the non-euro area 
countries, gap that was inverted in the 1980s, remains the most salient fact.  
 
 
 
 GDP and GDP per head, annual growth in % 
 
 
 
Average 1979-1991 Average 1992-1998 Average 1999-2007 
 
GDP  
(volume) 
 
 
GPD per head 
(GDP / Working 
age population) 
 
GDP 
  
 
GPD per 
head 
 
GDP 
  
 
GPD per 
head 
 
Three big euro area 2,56 1,77 1,48 1,28 1,72 1,65 
Euro area 2,5 1,68 1,76 1,44 2,18 1,82 
EU non-euro 1,99 1,62 2,59 2,35 2,77 2,09 
US 2,74 1,44 3,56 2,49 2,75 1,36 
Data source: OECD. 
 
 
The situation in terms of unemployment rate reflects growth dynamic: unemployment was the 
lowest in the three big euro area countries in the 1980s, and increased in the 1990s to decline 
a bit in the 2000s, but the unemployment level of the euro area and in the three big euro area 
countries is still almost 40% higher in the 2000s that in the US and in the EU 15 non-euro 
area countries.  
 
 
 
 
Unemployment rate  
(in % of active population) 
    
 Average Average Average 
 1979-1991 1992-1998 1999-2007
    
Three big euro area 6,61 9,46 8,64 
Euro area 7,52 9,89 8,31 
EU non-euro 8,15 8,25 5,14 
US 7,00 5,85 4,95 
Data source: OECD. 
 
 
 
Labour productivity dynamic also shows that the phase of monetary convergence and 
monetary union saw a decline in labour productivity for euro area countries, very important in 
the 2000s, which can be explained by the employment surge.  
 
 
 Labour productivity,  
annual growth in % 
 
    
 Average Average Average 
 1979-1991 1992-1998 1999-2007
    
Three big euro area 1,70 1,66 0,78 
Euro area 1,80 1,60 0,78 
EU non-euro 1,58 2,45 1,81 
US 1,00 1,56 1,87 
Data source: OECD. 
 
 
The European Commission produced in March 2008 its own assessment of the monetary 
union record with a similar focus on comparison between euro area countries, non-euro area 
countries and the US. The findings are consistent with ours: the nominal performance of the 
euro area are not better than those of non-euro countries, but its real economic performance is 
significantly worse, as it is also worse than that of the US.  
 
 
 
  Euro area EU non-euro 
  1989-1998 1999-2008 1989-1998 1999-2008 
Nominal performance     
      
Inflation  % 3,3 2,2 3,4 1,7 
Fiscal balance  % of GDP  -4,3 -1,7 -3,6 -0,9 
Gross public debt  % of GDP  68,6 68,6 48,7 43 
Long term interest rate  % 8,1 4,4 8,6 4,9 
Real long term interest rate % 4,7 2,4 4,2 3,3 
      
Real performance     
      
Real GDP  % rate of change 2,2 2,1 2 2,7 
Real GDP per capita  % rate of change 1,9 1,6 1,7 2,2 
Real GDP per capita  index, US =100  73 72 74 76 
Employment  % rate of change 0,6 1,3 0,1 0,9 
Labour productivity  % rate of change 1,6 0,8 1,9 1,8 
Unemployment  % of labour force 9,3 8,3 7,9 5,2 
Data source: European Commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Euro area US 
  1989-1998 1999-2008 1989-1998 1999-2008 
      
Nominal performance     
      
Inflation  % 3,3 2,2 3,3 2,8 
Fiscal balance  % of GDP  -4,3 -1,7 -3,3 -2,5 
Gross public debt  % of GDP  68,6 68,6 67,8 60,7 
Long term interest rate  % 8,1 4,4 7,1 4,8 
Real long term interest rate % 4,7 2,4 4,3 2,4 
      
Real performance     
      
Real GDP  % rate of change 2,2 2,1 3 2,6 
Real GDP per capita  % rate of change 1,9 1,6 1,8 1,6 
Real GDP per capita  index, US =100  73 72 100 100 
Employment  % rate of change 0,6 1,3 1,5 1 
Labour productivity  % rate of change 1,6 0,8 1,5 1,6 
Unemployment  % of labour force 9,3 8,3 5,8 5 
Data source: European Commission. 
 
 
The question we now want to explore is that of the orientation of macroeconomic policies in 
the euro area and outside to figure out what role monetary and fiscal policy have played in 
this disappointing performance of the euro area.  
 
 
Monetary policy 
 
Monetary policy in the euro area in the last two decades can be assessed in two phases: 
monetary convergence and monetary union. It has to be evaluated given the economic shocks, 
i.e. we have to evaluate its reactivity to periods of economic contraction. We can do this using 
a simple Taylor rule first to see if monetary policy was restrictive and then to see if it was 
reactive. We can use the US as a benchmark.  
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Reading: shaded areas represent recession (negative growth) or quasi-recession (growth of less than 1%). Indeed 
the CEPR observes for the euro area that: “there was not a recession in 2001 or in 2003, but slow growth from 
the second to the fourth quarter in 2001 and a prolonged pause in the growth of economic activity in the first two 
quarters of 2003.” 
 
Data source: OECD. 
 
 
What seems obvious from the graph is that monetary policy in the euro area was always more 
restrictive than what the Taylor rule suggested. We can also see that the most important gap 
between the two occurred during the most severe recession in 1993, with actual rates the 
double of Taylor rule rates. Finally, monetary policy was not really reactive to the economic 
quasi-recession of 2002-2003: growth started to slow in 2001 but interest rate were first 
increased (see infra) and only gradually lowered afterwards. The US situation is in sharp 
contrast: monetary policy is very reactive to the economic context.  
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Datat source: OECD. 
 
 
One of the interests of this comparison lies in the understanding of the decision of the ECB to 
increase interest rate in July 2008, while the euro area economy was already in recession. 
Clearly, the ECB chose price stability over economic growth and aggravated the European 
recession instead of counter-balancing it. The reaction by the Fed stands in striking contrast. 
 
 
Euro area and US monetary policy 
 
Reading: The dark blue line represents the main policy rate of the central banks. The light blue line plots the 
effective overnight rate. The vertical line represents the time of entry into recession according to the CEPR for 
the Euro area and the NBER for the US. 
 
Graph source: OECD. 
 
 
The ECB actually made in 2008 exactly the exact same mistake as in 2001 when it resisted a 
necessary cut in interest rates, waiting for the worst to be certain in terms of economic growth 
instead of trying to prevent it. In the meantime, the Fed acted boldly on both occasions to 
keep the U.S. economy growing. After the 2001 recession, it took a year for the U.S. to go 
from negative to vigorous growth. The question of course remains to determine if the Fed 
should have kept interest rates at a low level for such a prolonged period of time after 2001, 
but it is a different issue than reactivity to downturns.    
 
One could argue that the ECB statutes command than it watches exclusively price stability, so 
that its statutes should be changed to avoid those systematic mistakes. But even this argument 
does not seem completely convincing: If article 105 of the European Community treaty 
indeed states that the “primary objective” of the ECB is to “maintain price stability”, it does 
not say that this shall be the only objective of the central bank. On the contrary, it adds that 
“without prejudice to the objective of price stability”, the ECB should help achieve the 
European Union’s goals, including a “sustainable and non-inflationary growth”. In other 
words, by focusing exclusively on inflation the ECB only fulfils part its mandate. Even more 
troubling is the fact that the ECB’s governing council, when it defined its policy strategy in 
October 1998, acknowledged that the commitment to maintain price stability “over the 
medium term ... reflects the need for monetary policy to have a forward-looking orientation” 
and that it also “acknowledges the existence of short-term volatility in prices which cannot be 
controlled by monetary policy”. 
 
This is precisely what happened in 2008: overall inflation increased artificially because of 
energy prices while core inflation remained stable. When the ECB took its policy decision in 
July 2008, inflation was about to decline because of the global recession.  
 
 
Headline and core inflation in the euro area 
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Reading: The vertical line represents the moment when the ECB decided to increase interest rates to 4,25%.  
Data source: ECB. 
 
An exchange rate policy? 
 
The exchange rate policy in the euro area has been completely submitted to the objective of 
price stability, so that the ECB controls de facto the exchange rate policy while de jure it is a 
shared competence with the Council5. As a result, the euro does not boost growth in the euro 
area, all the contrary. Since 1999, its exchange rate has gone down when economic activity 
was up and has increased when growth slowed down. The euro is mainly dependent on the 
ECB’s anti inflationary stance. The price to be paid for price stability is high exchange rate 
volatility. 
 
 
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
19
99
Q1
19
99
Q2
19
99
Q3
19
99
Q4
20
00
Q1
20
00
Q2
20
00
Q3
20
00
Q4
20
01
Q1
20
01
Q2
20
01
Q3
20
01
Q4
20
02
Q1
20
02
Q2
20
02
Q3
20
02
Q4
20
03
Q1
20
03
Q2
20
03
Q3
20
03
Q4
20
04
Q1
20
04
Q2
20
04
Q3
20
04
Q4
20
05
Q1
20
05
Q2
20
05
Q3
20
05
Q4
20
06
Q1
20
06
Q2
20
06
Q3
20
06
Q4
20
07
Q1
20
07
Q2
20
07
Q3
20
07
Q4
20
08
Q1
20
08
Q2
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
Effective exchange rate of the euro (left scale) Real GDP growth (right scale)
 
Data source: ECB. 
 
 
The management of exchange rate policy is very different in the US, the UK and Sweden. The 
evolution of the US dollar has been a stabilizing factor since 1992, with the brief exception of 
the 2001 shock. Until 2000, the dollar’s appreciation occurred in a period of high growth, 
while from 2002 onwards, the US currency’s depreciation has sustained the upturn in the 
economy. The periods of currency appreciation persisted as long as growth rates in volume 
topped 3% in annual rate in the United Kingdom. Sweden’s case is particularly enlightening. 
Even though the Swedish krona may well have remained stable against the euro, this does not 
change the fact that the country has pursued a counter-cyclical exchange rate policy, which is 
a wise move for a small economy like Sweden’s since it is currently wide open to the outside 
world. Moreover, Sweden is outside the euro area, which means it has potentially more room 
for manoeuvre over it exchange and monetary policies than euro zone members. Thus, unlike 
its euro area counterparts, the Swedish Central bank has led an exchange rate policy resulting 
in a counter cyclical evolution of its exchange rate since 2001. The Swedish krona was at its 
lowest point in 2001 at a time when its GDP in volume was increasing by just over 1% a year. 
Then the currency’s value went up, essentially against the dollar, which astutely supported the 
economy’s recovery. Therefore, the Swedish krona’s relative stability against the euro, 
                                                 
5 See Creel, Laurent and Le Cacheux (2007).  
especially since the Swedes decided not to adopt the euro, does not show that Sweden has 
stopped using its exchange rate to promote, or simply to defend, economic growth.  
 
In the euro area on the contrary when the euro was already appreciating in 2006, the ECB 
pushed it upwards until July 2008. This means that monetary conditions, i.e. the combination 
of interest rates and exchange rates, has been historically restrictive in the euro area in 2007 
and 2008, right before the euro area entered into recession.  
 
 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
19
99
Ja
n
19
99
Ap
r
19
99
Ju
l
19
99
Oc
t
20
00
Ja
n
20
00
Ap
r
20
00
Ju
l
20
00
Oc
t
20
01
Ja
n
20
01
Ap
r
20
01
Ju
l
20
01
Oc
t
20
02
Ja
n
20
02
Ap
r
20
02
Ju
l
20
02
Oc
t
20
03
Ja
n
20
03
Ap
r
20
03
Ju
l
20
03
Oc
t
20
04
Ja
n
20
04
Ap
r
20
04
Ju
l
20
04
Oc
t
20
05
Ja
n
20
05
Ap
r
20
05
Ju
l
20
05
Oc
t
20
06
Ja
n
20
06
Ap
r
20
06
Ju
l
20
06
Oc
t
20
07
Ja
n
20
07
Ap
r
20
07
Ju
l
20
07
Oc
t
20
08
Ja
n
20
08
Ap
r
20
08
Ju
l
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
Effective exchange rate of the euro (right scale) ECB policy rate (left scale)
 
Data source: ECB. 
 
 
 
Discretionary fiscal policy 
 
We only consider here discretionary fiscal policy, as we will detail the state of European 
automatic stabilizers in the following section. We use the traditional fiscal impulse indicator 
(measured as the inverse of the variations of the structural primary balance-potential GDP 
ratio) to assess discretionary fiscal policy in the euro area, the EU 15 non-euro area countries 
and the US.  
 
The comparison between the euro area and the US is, once again, striking: the euro area does 
almost not respond to the two major shocks it faced in 1993 and 2002-2003, but seems to 
respond to another logic: that of monetary convergence (witness the negative shocks of 1996 
and 1997 to satisfy Maastricht criteria). The US on the contrary responded to the shock of 
1991 and even more importantly to the shock of 2001.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal impulse in the euro area and the US 
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Data source: OECD. 
 
 
The comparison between the big three euro area countries and the UK exhibits the same 
discrepancy in terms of fiscal reactivity: one policy is mostly pro-cyclical and the other is 
mostly counter-cyclical.  
 
 
 
Fiscal impulse in the euro area and the UK 
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Data source: OECD. 
 
The paradox of the different approaches to fiscal policy in the last two decades within the 
euro area, outside the euro area in the EU 15 and in the US, can be illustrated by the evolution 
of the overall level of public debt. Even if fiscal policy and public finance have been 
constrained by Maastricht criteria and then by the Stability and growth Pact, public debt has 
actually been the highest in the euro area, and even higher in Germany, France and Italy, in 
the last decade, while it was lower there than in the US prior in 1991. It has indeed increased 
the most during the monetary convergence decade.  
 
 
 
                            Public debt (in % of GDP) 
 
 1991 1998 2007 
    
Three big euro area 37,5 56,6 53,4 
Euro area 45,0 53,4 44,8 
EU non-euro 13,5 40,5 20,9 
US 48,9 45,9 43,8 
Source: OECD. 
 
 
 
The euro area fiscal response in the crisis has so far been very timid, even while the economic 
context has continuously worsened, not to mention the fact that the fiscal response has not 
been coordinated between member states. Estimates by the IMF and OECD show how meagre 
the euro area fiscal response is so far compared to the US and the rest of the developed world: 
actually, according to the OECD, in 2008 and 2009, the euro area fiscal impulse will be 
negative. 
 
 
Fiscal stimulus packages in large countries (in percent of GDP) 
 
2008 2009 
 
Canada 0.0 1.5 
China 0.4 2.0 
France 0.0 0.7 
Germany 0.0 1.5 
Italy 0.0 0.2 
Japan 0.4 1.4 
U.K. 0.2 1.4 
USA 1.1 2.0 
 
Average 0.5 1.6 
Data source: IMF. 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal impulse for 2008 and 2009, in % of GDP 
 
 2008 2009 
 
USA 3.5 6.1 
Euro area -1.2 -0.5 
OECD 1.4 3.1 
Data source: OECD. 
 
 
 
The policy mix 
 
All in all, the evidence we have presented lead us to conclude that the policy mix in the euro 
area has been substantially more restrictive than in the non-euro area and in the US and that 
the reactivity of macroeconomic policies has been much weaker. This general pattern has 
been even more marked in the face of the current crisis. If “automatic stabilizers” were 
exceptionally efficient in the EU, that would have proved not to be a major problem.  
 
 
The “structural” destabilization of Europe  
 
 
In the early 1990s, a theoretical and empirical case was made in favour of “structural reforms” 
promoting labour market flexibility and welfare state downsizing as the way out of massive 
unemployment for European countries. Virtually all of them, as well as EU institutions,  
embraced this new economic and social strategy and embarked on this program of “structural 
reforms”.  
 
Yet, as noted in Fitoussi (2003), “there has been no convincing evidence that labor market 
institutions are responsible for the high level of unemployment in Continental Europe or for 
the disappointing macroeconomic performances for Europe during the 1990s. Economic 
outcomes are more easily explained by the big shocks that OECD countries have suffered: 
changing trend in productivity growth, the oil shocks, the important increase in the real rate of 
interest…At best empirical studies are able to explain second order of importance effects of 
institutions on unemployment…In market democracies, the institutional structure is not a 
powerful factor in explaining economic performance”6. 
 
But it does not follow that the European “commitment to structural reforms” of social models 
was of no consequence. It indeed contributed both to an increase in economic vulnerability to 
economic shocks or decrease in economic resilience (the capacity of the economic system to 
respond efficiently to a given shock) and to an insufficiency in aggregate demand because of a 
too low wage level. More generally, the “automatic stabilizers” that are put forward in the 
current crisis by European countries have been weakened in the last two decades.  
 
                                                 
6 For empirical evidence of the absence of substantial empirical evidence between institutional features 
of social models and employment performance, see inter alia Fitoussi, Passet (2000), Freeman (2000), 
Palley (2004), Howell (2005), Baker et al. (2005), Freeman (2005). 
As noted by Creel and Saraceno (2008), “the effectiveness of automatic stabilisers depends on 
the sensitivity of government revenues and spending to economic fluctuations and on the 
sensitivity of economic activity to cyclical changes in government revenues and spending. 
Among the factors affecting budgetary sensitivity, the literature highlights the size of the 
public sector, the progressivity of the tax and benefit system, the sensitivity of tax bases to 
economic fluctuations, the institutional time profile of the tax system, the level of 
unemployment benefits and the sensitivity of unemployment to fluctuations in economic 
activity.” 
 
The authors review the different macroeconometric models that estimate the percentage of 
fluctuations in output which are smoothed by automatic stabilisers. They note that “the scope 
of automatic stabilisers in the EU is low: at best, they smoothed a maximum of 36% of 
economic fluctuations and at worst only 5% of them.” 
 
After having assessed the evolution and state of a number of automatic stabilizers in the EU, 
the authors conclude that there is a contradiction between the European Union fiscal rules that 
are aimed at preventing discretionary fiscal policy and the fact that automatic stabilizers have 
been weakened: “On the one hand [the Stability and growth Pact] is designed with the 
objective to rule out any discretion in the conduct of fiscal policy, thus leaving to automatic 
stabilisation the exclusive burden of countercyclical policy; on the other hand, though, a 
number of stylized facts that we reported in the paper point to a significant decrease of the 
role of automatic stabilisation. Progressivity of the tax system and the size of the public sector 
have been reduced in most European countries, and structural breaks in the sensitivity of 
public spending to GDP changes appeared in the 1990s.” 
 
In the following sub-sections, we are going to essentially confirm this argument, adding to the 
authors’ points the question of wages and labour market flexibility. We first start with the 
traditional automatic stabilizer, unemployment benefit. 
 
 
 
Unemployment benefits 
 
As the OECD pointed out in 2007, “a number of OECD countries have lowered replacement 
rates or the duration of benefits since 1994”. Actually, the EU countries that did so followed 
the OECD Job study strategy recommendations. Whether by lowering the level or duration of 
unemployment benefit, there is little doubt that this automatic stabilizer has been significantly 
weakened during the last two decades in EU countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unemployment benefit systems: policy reforms over the 1994-2004 period 
 
 Benefit generosity 
 
Replacement rates Duration 
Austria [+, -]   
Denmark + + 
France - + 
Germany [+, -] + 
Netherlands  + 
Spain + - 
Sweden [+, -]   
UK +  
 
Reading:  
+ : Reforms following the OECD Jobs Strategy;   
- : Reforms contrary to the OECD Jobs Strategy;  
[+, -] : Reform elements going in different directions.       
       
Data source: OECD. 
 
 
This policy is part of a more general pattern of reform of labour market aiming at promoting 
flexibility, a flexibility that, during an economic downturn, becomes a liability and not an 
asset as people lose their jobs faster, driving down consumption and investment. 
 
  
Flexibility of the labour market 
 
One possible measure of increased flexibility in European labour markets is the OECD 
employment protection index. It shows that most of the reforms took place after 1994, with a 
substantial lowering of employment protection in the European Union under the form of 
change in temporary employment legislation, while permanent employment legislation 
remained unchanged in many countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employment protection in the EU 15 
 
 Late 1980 to 1994 1994 to 2003 
     
 
Total 
change 
EPL 
Change in 
permanent 
employment 
legislation
Change in 
temporary 
employment 
legislation 
Total 
change 
EPL 
Change in 
permanent 
employment 
legislation 
Change in 
temporary 
employment 
legislation
             
Austria 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,27 -0,27 0,00 
Denmark 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,90 -0,02 -0,88 
Finland -0,16 -0,16 0,00 -0,15 -0,15 0,00 
France 0,20 -0,08 0,28 0,06 0,06 0,00 
Germany -0,08 0,05 -0,13 -0,74 0,00 -0,74 
Italy 0,00 0,00 0,00 -1,63 0,00 -1,63 
Netherlands 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,61 -0,02 -0,59 
Norway 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,33 0,00 -0,33 
Spain -0,71 -0,46 -0,25 -0,05 -0,18 0,13 
Sweden -1,02 -0,02 -0,99 -0,24 0,00 -0,24 
United Kingdom 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,15 0,08 0,06 
Data source: OECD. 
 
 
In addition, part-time employment expanded rapidly in the last decade to represent in 2006 
close to 20% of all employment in the euro area, with some countries like Germany or the UK 
at more than 25%.  
 
 
 
Persons employed working part-time
(% of total employment) 
 
 1996 2001 2006 
 
Euro area 
 
14,1 
 
16,1 
 
19,5 
Denmark 21,9 20,1 23,6 
Germany 16,7 20,3 25,8 
Spain 7,6 8,0 12,0 
France 16,3 16,3 17,2 
Italy 6,5 8,4 13,3 
Netherlands 38,0 42,2 46,2 
Austria 14,0 18,2 21,8 
Sweden 20,2 21,1 25,1 
United Kingdom 24,6 25,1 25,5 
Data source: Eurostat. 
 
 
 
 
This evolution shades some light on the increase in employment highlighted above. As the 
European Trade Union Confederation (2008) notes: “In fact, much of the increase in 
employment rates since 2000 can be explained by the rise in part-time jobs and the 
employment rate, expressed in full time equivalents, has hardly moved between 2001 and 
2006 (from 58,2 to 58,9%)”. It also means that, as unemployment rises again, it will probably 
rise quite fast (the example of Spain, that with 7 million jobs created since the mid-nineties, 
accounts for an important part of  all job creation in the EU is striking: the unemployment rate 
has doubled in 18 months to reach 16% in February 2009). 
 
 
Wages in the EU 
 
Labour market flexibility has also been increased with regards to wages. Actually, the much-
maligned European “wage rigidity” seems to have almost completely disappeared in the EU 
15 since 2000, with real wages growth declining in almost all countries. The euro area 
countries, especially Germany, Italy and Spain, have exhibited close to zero and even 
negative evolution of real wages since 2000, while EU 15 non euro-area countries displayed 
better performance, as did Norway. This seems to reflect a trend towards wage disinflation in 
the euro area to which we will come back in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
Average annual growth rates of real average wages (%) 
 
 
    
 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
 
Austria 1,8 0,4 0,9 
Finland 0 1,3 2,5 
France 1,1 1,3 1,3 
Germany 2,1 0,8 0,2 
Italy -0,7 0,8 0,2 
Netherlands 0,3 0 0,5 
Spain 1,9 -0,5 -0,4 
 
Denmark 0,8 1,6 1,5 
Sweden -0,2 3,2 1,5 
United Kingdom 0,9 2,5 1,6 
 
Norway 1,2 1,9 3,6 
 
OECD Europe 1,4 1,4 1 
EU-15 1 1,1 0,7 
 
Data Source: OECD.  
 
 
When weighted by their GDP, it appears that the euro area countries have experienced a sharp 
decline in real wages growth in the last decade, so much so that wages did not, for the most 
part of the period, compensate labour productivity and inflation. The gap between wages, on 
the one hand, and productivity and inflation on the other, amounted to almost 7.5 percentage 
point from 1996 to 2007.  
 
As a result of this general evolution, the wage share in value added, that had already 
substantially decreased in the 1980s, declined further in the 1990s and the 2000s. The total 
decline in wage share in the EU 15 for the last two decades has been close to 5 points, while it 
was only 2 points in the US. 
 
 
Share of total wages and salaries in total value added, percentage 
 
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
EU‐15 United States
Data source: OECD. 
 
Tax policy 
Finally, the evolution of tax policy is important in two ways for our story. First, because the 
intensity of corporate and high income taxation determine in part the efficiency of automatic 
stabilizers, but also because the degree of redistribution of the tax system is itself an 
automatic stabilizer. In this respect, the fierce tax competition between EU countries in the 
last two decades has lead to a spectacular decline of corporate taxation. 
 
 
 
Corporate tax rate, in % 
 Average EU 15* USA Japan 
 
 
effective statutory effective statutory effective statutory 
    
1987 29% 48% 23% 38% 42% 55% 
1997 22% 38% 24% 39% 37% 50% 
2005 21% 32% 24% 39% 28% 40% 
 
* Average EU 15 is un-weighted average of France, Germany, UK, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Austria, Sweden.  
 
Data source: updates database from Devereux, M.P., R. Griffith and A. Klemm (2002) “Corporate income tax 
reforms and international tax competition” Economic Policy, 35: 451-495. 
 
This evolution led to the fact that, according to OECD data, EU 15 countries had in 2008 the 
the lowest corporate taxation rates when compared with similarly developed countries and 
also in the fact that, according to KPMG annual study, in 2007 the EU became the region 
where corporate taxation was the lowest in the world. 
Laurent (2006) showed how the development of capital mobility in the EU without tax 
harmonization has triggered this spectacular fall in corporate taxation that in turn has 
triggered a spectacular fall in high-income taxation that in turn has affected personal income 
taxation and eventually the relative tax burdens put on capital and labor. The first dynamic 
occurred between 1986 and 1993 and was analyzed by the European Commission itself. The 
European Commission (1996) noted that “while the taxation of labour has been increasing, 
the taxation of factors of production other than labour has shown an overall decrease” and that 
“the stability of total tax revenues has been achieved at the cost of a progressive alteration in 
the structure of taxation: the tax burden has been shifted to the less mobile tax base - labour - 
in order to recover the tax lost from the erosion of other more mobile bases.” The European 
Commission estimates that “Between 1980 and 1993, the implicit tax rate7 on employed 
labour for the Community as a whole grew by about one fifth while the same indicator for 
other factors of production - mainly self-employed labour and capital – decreased by more 
than a tenth.” The European Commission (1997) similarly stated that “over the last 15 
years…the implicit tax rate on employed labour has increased by more than 7 percentage points, 
whereas the same rate for other factors of production (capital, self-employed labour, energy, 
natural resources) has decreased by more than 10 percentage points.” 
The dynamic between the mid-1990s and today is more complex. It is so because taxation on 
low-skilled labour has been lowered as part of the new European employment strategy in the 
late 1990s (which explains why labour productivity has simultaneously fallen) so that another 
division than just between capital and labour taxation is needed to fully grasp the shift in 
taxation burdens that occurred during the last decade. The additional category that must be 
                                                 
7 “From a macroeconomics point of view, a tax rate is calculated by dividing the revenues from taxes on a 
special activity or good by an appropriate corresponding aggregate tax base from national accounts statistics. 
This yields the implicit tax rate (ITR), sometimes also referred to as an average or effective tax rate.” Source: 
Coded, Eurostat, http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/coded/info/data/coded/en.htm  
 
used is indirect taxation: in the last decade, in a number of EU 15 countries, the tax burden 
has been shifted from direct to indirect taxation reflecting the intensity of tax competition but 
also the need to limit taxation on low-skilled labour.  
 
 Marginal personal income tax rate Value added tax rate 
 
 
2000 2006 2000 2007 
 
Austria 41.31 44.88 20 20 
France 39.27 36.78 20.6 19.6 
Germany 60.85 58.97 16 19 
Italy 40.43 37.1 20 20 
The Netherlands 53.06 45.02 17.5 19 
Spain 28.83 28.83 16 16 
Euro area 44.18 41.65 18.67 19.38 
Data source: OECD. 
 
We thus conclude that automatic stabilizers were indeed substantially lowered for most EU 
countries, and especially those in the euro area, which lead us to confirm our earlier 
assessment: the European position in the current crisis with regards to its macroeconomic 
response relies on the false assumption that automatic stabilizers are strong enough so that a 
discretionary macroeconomic response is not necessary. It is in our view necessary. We now 
conclude with some hypotheses as to why the two shifts we have signalled happened. 
 
The false virtue of rules and the economic consequences of the size of nations  
 
European countries belonging to the euro area, but more generally EU 15 countries involved 
at different stages of EMU, have relied on rules to govern their macroeconomic policies and 
those rules have not served them well in the last two decades. Moreover, these rules have 
brought about a culture of discipline but not of cooperation and they led to a nominal and 
largely artificial and therefore fragile convergence. One empirical measure of it is the degree 
of divergence before and after monetary union between euro area member states in terms of 
inflation and real long-term interest rates on the one hand, and in terms of real growth and 
current balance on the other. The result is eloquent: while nominal convergence has been 
improved, simultaneously real divergence has been aggravated.  
 
Standard deviation for euro area countries 
 Inflation 
rate 
Real long-term 
interest rates 
Real GDP 
growth 
Current 
account 
(in % of 
GDP) 
Average 
1979-1991 5,65 1,74 0,90 2,34 
Average 
1992-1998 2,29 1,05 1,56 3,96 
Average 
1998-2007 0,73 0,85 1,54 5,07 
Data source: OECD. 
 
Hence the disappointing European response to the current crisis in terms of fiscal and 
regulation policies so far: European interest are not congruent after two decades of economic 
integration. The last column of the table is of utmost importance: it shows the degree of 
current account divergence and this divergence is at the heart of our first explanation for the 
two shifts in macroeconomic and social policies we have been describing in the two previous 
sections. Our reasoning is straightforward: the paralysis of macroeconomic instruments has 
pushed European states in the euro area to develop non cooperative competitiveness policies, 
using social-tax competition and wage disinflation. The economic policy of Germany in the 
2000s is emblematic of this strategy, as were in the mid-1980s the competitive disinflation 
strategy in France. 
 
The country size nexus comes into play in the following way8: whereas countries not 
belonging to a monetary union can control their fiscal and monetary policy and manipulate 
their external nominal exchange rate in case of necessity, countries in a monetary union 
cannot do so, and have to live with constraining rules on fiscal policies, the common interest 
rates and the common external exchange rate. For a small open economy, this loss is not very 
costly: traditional fiscal policy of the Keynesian type will usually be of little efficiency, 
whereas all policies that improve the competitiveness of the national economy by lowering 
production costs of firms located in the domestic economy are relatively more powerful. Tax 
competition, “structural reforms” and wage moderation policies will indeed all have very 
powerful, positive effects for a small open economy, both because domestic demand represent 
a fraction of demand to domestic firms and because the elasticity of net exports is higher, the 
smaller and the more open the economy is. In addition, policies that lower production costs in 
a small economy do not harm domestic demand very much, and they have little incidence on 
domestic inflation, so that they do not raise real interest rates, as nominal rates in a monetary 
union tend to be uniform across countries and to be relatively less influenced by the policies 
of a single, small country. 
 
For large countries on the contrary, the various policies reviewed above tend to be more 
costly. Keynesian-style demand-management policies, especially fiscal policies, are more 
efficient for large relatively closed economies than for small open economies. On the other 
hand, all policies tending to lower production costs are less effective, and they all tend to lead 
to a lower domestic inflation, which then results in a higher real interest rate, so that they tend 
to be costly in terms of economic activity and growth. This is where the rules constraining the 
                                                 
8 See Le Cacheux (2005), Laurent and Le Cacheux (2006) and Laurent and Le Cacheux (2007). 
use of stabilization policies in the Euro area are paramount: they are much more painful for 
large countries than for small nations. For this reason, the Maastricht “culture of discipline” 
and the European commitment to “structural reforms” have hurt large countries much more 
than small ones in the euro area, while outside the euro area the macroeconomic performance 
of Denmark, Sweden and the UK does not differ a great deal.  
 
The case of Germany is particularly striking. Laurent and Le Cacheux (2007) noted that if the 
German competitiveness effort has been a huge success in terms of growth of net exports 
since 2000, it is still hardly compatible with the fact that Germany is a large country. It 
appears that the “shrinking” of Germany has, so far, been a counter-productive small country 
growth strategy in fair weather. But the situation of Germany in 2009 highlights the danger of 
this strategy in time of crisis: exposure to international trade acts as an “economic de-
stabilizer”.  
 
 
Trade openness and unit labour cost in Germany, 1987-2007 
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Data source: OECD. 
 
So why did Germany choose it in the first place? One can argue that in the face of 
globalization, all countries have become small and that Germany simply decided to 
acknowledge this fact. But Germany is first and foremost part of European integration. As 
such, it is subject to the incentives system devised by the “European economic constitution” 
whereby large countries are encouraged to behave like small ones, competing through real 
“social disinflation”, adopting competitiveness policies focused on labor cost reduction 
instead of stimulating their domestic market through macroeconomic policies. Since large 
continental countries are precisely not small, the results are neither good for them nor for the 
euro area. These policies have in return triggered strategic reactions from the other large 
countries, which in turn engage in the social race to the bottom. Hence the relation between 
the two shifts we have highlighted.  
 
 
The paradox of course is that monetary union was created inter alia to avoid non-cooperative 
competitive disinflation strategies seen in the 1980s and not to find new ways to continue it 
by other means. As euro area member states rationally behave like a collection of small 
competing economies instead of a single cohesive one, pursuing competitiveness at the 
expense of one another, monetary union runs the risk of being turned into a zero, or even a 
negative-sum game. The recent evolution of tax competition on corporate taxation is a salient 
illustration of how not only small countries compete against large ones in the Euro area, but 
also large ones among themselves. Wage disinflation by Germany is another case in point. If 
the euro area continues to be run like a collection of competing small economies, the result 
will not only be slow regional growth and persistent unemployment, but also growing 
divergence among member states and rising political tensions. The difficulty for the euro area 
to develop a consistent, coordinated and adequate response to the crisis can be read as a 
symptom of this pathology. 
 
 
 
Two deep determinants: public social custom and a new norm of inequality 
 
 
Public social custom 
 
Fitoussi and Saraceno (2004) have tried to explain why and how inefficient rules governing 
macroeconomic policies and inefficient and unfair “structural reforms” have been 
implemented in the EU. They insist on reputation effects in European institutions and note 
that: “a newly elected government, regardless of its political colour and mandate, must show 
to its EU partners that it is in fact worthy of sitting at the table. As a consequence, it will 
adhere to the mainstream agenda regardless of its convenience and of the electorate 
preferences. Paradoxically, governments whose constituencies care more about the social 
contract, will be those who must work harder to convince the partners, pushing the reforms 
aimed at dismantling the contract itself”. 
 
A new norm of inequality 
 
Fitoussi (2006) puts forward an even deeper determinant to explain the difference in 
macroeconomic policies management in the euro area and in the US. If one assumes that over 
the past decades social norms have changed and that the new norms call for a greater degree 
of inequality, then “macroeconomic policies have to be active where the social protection 
system is weak or equivalently where the degree of inequality has reached the level required 
by the new social norms. Otherwise a slowdown of growth, not to say a recession, would have 
such far reaching consequences, that it will endanger the legitimacy of the economic system.” 
In the EU, “by making the burden of adjustment fall on the social protection system, 
restrictive macroeconomic policy show its effectiveness, once its implicit goal of increasing 
the degree of inequality – i.e. to adapt to the new social norm – has been recognized.” In other 
words, “macroeconomic policies have to be active where this higher degree of inequality has 
been achieved – in the United States – and passive where it has not, so as to achieve it [the 
EU].” 
 
The dynamic of income inequality in the EU in the last two decades indeed shows that many 
EU countries have witnessed a strong increase in income inequality at odds with their 
historical commitment to fairness and redistribution.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trends in real household income by quintiles  
     
 
Bottom 
quintile 
Middle 
three 
quintiles 
Top 
quintile  
 
(Average annual change mid-1980s to mid-1990s) 
 
 
OECD-22 1,2 1,4 2,1  
Average EU 9* 1,2 1,6 2  
 
 
(Average annual change mid-1990s to mid-2000s) 
 
 
OECD-22 
 
1,5 
 
1,8 
 
1,9  
Average EU 9* 1,3 1,6 1,8  
 
* The un-weighted average for the 10 countries in the project, minus Norway. 
Data source: OECD. 
 
 
Conclusion: for a comprehensive approach to national models 
 
As James Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan put it, “good games depend on good rules more 
than they depend on good players”. If macroeconomic policies have not lead to efficiency and 
fairness in the EU in the last two decades as we tend to think, then European leaders should 
not take the blame for it. It is more likely the design of economic policy institutions that led to 
wrong incentives, especially in the heart of Economic Europe, the euro area. We have tried to 
make clear that those inefficient macroeconomic rules had a spill-over effect and that brings 
us to our final point. 
 
There has been a tendency in the literature to taxonomize social models and to categorize 
them according to their degree of equity or efficiency (see Sapir, 2005). Contrary to this 
position, we think that national “models” or better yet systems should be assessed in an 
integrated manner, by taking into account social and macroeconomic policies. With this 
comprehensive approach, it would be harder to miss inconsistencies and spill-overs.  
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